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Abstract
Blockchain technologies are taking the world by storm. Public blockchains, such as
Bitcoin and Ethereum, enable secure peer-to-peer applications like crypto-currency or
smart contracts. Their security and performance are well studied. This thesis concerns
recent private blockchain systems designed with stronger security (trust) assumption and
performance requirement. These systems aim to disrupt applications which have so far
been implemented on top of database systems, e.g., banking, finance, and trading. Mul-
tiple platforms for private blockchains are under active development and fine-tuning.
However, there is an evident lack of a systematic framework with which different sys-
tems can be analyzed and compared against each other. Such a framework can be used
to assess blockchains’ viability as another distributed data processing platform while
helping developers to identify bottlenecks and accordingly improve their platforms.
In this thesis, we first describe BLOCKBENCH, the first evaluation framework for an-
alyzing private blockchains. Any private blockchain can be integrated to BLOCKBENCH
via simple APIs and benchmarked against workloads that are based on real and synthetic
smart contracts. BLOCKBENCH measures overall and component-wise performance
regarding throughput, latency, scalability, and fault-tolerance. Next, we use BLOCK-
BENCH to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of three major private blockchains: Ethereum,
Parity and Hyperledger Fabric. The results demonstrate that these systems are still far
from displacing current database systems in traditional data processing workloads. Fur-
thermore, there are gaps in performance among the three systems which are attributed to
the design choices at different layers of the blockchain’s software stack. BLOCKBENCH
serves as a fair means of comparison for different platforms and enables a deeper under-
standing of different system design choices.
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Blockchain technologies are gaining massive momentum in the last few years, largely
due to the success of Bitcoin crypto-currency [46]. A blockchain, also called distributed
ledger, is essentially an append-only data structure maintained by a set of nodes which
do not fully trust each other. All nodes in a blockchain network agree on an ordered set
of blocks, each containing multiple transactions, thus the blockchain can be viewed as
a log of ordered transactions. In a database context, blockchain can be viewed as a so-
lution to distributed transaction management: nodes keep replicas of the data and agree
on an execution order of transactions. However, traditional database systems work in a
trusted environment and employ well-known concurrency control techniques [10, 40, 57]
to order transactions. Blockchain’s key advantage is that it does not assume nodes trust
each other and therefore is designed to achieve Byzantine fault tolerance.
In the original design, Bitcoin’s blockchain stores coins as the system states shared
by all participants. For this simple application, Bitcoin nodes implement a simple repli-
cated state machine model which simply moves coins from one address to another. Since
then, blockchain has grown rapidly to support user-defined states and Turing complete
state machine models. Ethereum [2] is a well-known example which enables any de-
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centralized, replicated applications known as smart contracts. More importantly, inter-
est from the industry has started to drive the development of new blockchain platforms
that are designed for private settings in which participants are authenticated. Blockchain
systems in such environments are called private (or permissioned), as opposed to the
early systems operating in public (or permissionless) environments where anyone can
join and leave. Applications for security trading and settlement [53], asset and financial
management [44, 45], banking and insurance [30] are being built and evaluated. These
applications are currently supported by enterprise-grade database systems like Oracle
and MySQL, but blockchain has the potential to disrupt this status quo because it incurs
lower infrastructure and human costs [30]. In particular, blockchain’s immutability and
transparency help reduce human errors and the need for manual intervention due to con-
flicting data. Blockchain can help streamline business processes by removing duplicate
efforts in data governance. Goldman Sachs estimated 6 billion saving in the current cap-
ital market [30], and J.P. Morgan forecast that blockchains will start to replace currently
redundant infrastructure by 2020 [45].
Given this trend in employing blockchain in settings where database technologies
have established dominance, one question to ask is to what extent can blockchain handle
data processing workload. Another question is which platform to choose from many that
are available today because even though blockchain is an open protocol, different plat-
forms exist in silo. In this work, we develop a benchmarking framework called BLOCK-
BENCH to address both questions. BLOCKBENCH is the first benchmark for studying
and comparing the performance of private blockchains. By assuming authenticated iden-
tities in the permissioned settings, private blockchains can employ more efficient proto-
cols for tolerating Byzantine failure than in public settings. We do not focus on public
blockchains because their performance (and trade-offs against security guarantee) is rel-
atively well studied [11, 18, 26, 42]. Our framework is not only useful for application
developers to assess blockchain’s potentials in meeting the application need but also
offers insights for platform developers: helping them to identify and improve on the per-
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formance bottlenecks.
We face three challenges in developing BLOCKBENCH. First, a blockchain system
comprises many parts and we observe that a wide variety of design choices are made
among different platforms at almost every single detail. In BLOCKBENCH, we divide the
blockchain architecture into three modular layers and focus our study on them: the con-
sensus layer, data model, and execution layer. Second, there are many different choices
of platforms, but not all of them have reached a mature design, implementation, and an
established user base. For this, we start by designing BLOCKBENCH based on three most
mature platforms within our consideration, namely Ethereum [2], Parity [23], and Hy-
perledger [32], and then generalize to support future platforms. All three platforms sup-
port smart contracts and can be deployed in a private environment. Third, there is a lack
of database-oriented workloads for blockchains. Although the real Ethereum transac-
tions and contracts can be found on the public blockchain, it is unclear if such workload
is sufficiently representative to assess blockchain’s general data processing capabilities.
To address this challenge, we treat blockchain as a key-value storage coupled with an
engine which can realize both transactional and analytical functionality via smart con-
tracts. We then design and run both transaction and analytics workloads based on real
and synthetic data.
BLOCKBENCH is a flexible and extensible framework that provides a number of
workloads and comes with Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger as backends. Workloads
are transaction-oriented currently and designed to macro-benchmark and micro-benchmark
blockchain for supporting database-like applications. Specifically, the current macro-
benchmark includes a key-value (YCSB), an OLTP (Smallbank) workload and a num-
ber of real Ethereum smart contract workloads. For each of the consensus, data model,
and execution layer, there is at least a micro-benchmark workload to measure its perfor-
mance in isolation. For example, for the execution layer, BLOCKBENCH provides two
workloads that stress test the smart contract I/O and computation speed. New workloads
and blockchains can be easily integrated via a simple set of APIs. BLOCKBENCH quan-
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tifies the performance of a backend system in several dimensions: throughput, latency,
scalability and fault tolerance. It supports security evaluation by simulating network-
level attacks. Using BLOCKBENCH, we conduct an in-depth comparison of the three
blockchain systems on two macro benchmark and four micro benchmark workloads.
The results show that blockchain systems’ performance is limited, far below what is
expected of a state-of-the-art database system (such as H-Store). Hyperledger consis-
tently outperforms the other two systems across seven benchmarks. But it fails to scale
beyond 16 nodes. Our evaluation shows that the consensus protocols account for the per-
formance gap at the application layer for Ethereum and Hyperledger. We also identify
a processing bottleneck in Parity. Finally, our evaluation also reveals bottlenecks in the
execution and data layer of Ethereum and Parity.
In the next section, we will discuss blockchain systems in more detail.
1.2 Background
In this section, we first describe blockchain in its original design of Bitcoin, i.e. in the
public settings. Then we discuss the changes in recent systems, focusing on the private
settings.
Blockchain. A typical blockchain system consists of multiple nodes which do not
fully trust each other. Some nodes exhibit Byzantine behavior, but the majority is hon-
est. Together, the nodes maintain a set of shared, global states and perform transactions
modifying the states. Blockchain is a special data structure which maintains the states
and the historical transactions. All nodes in the system agree on the transactions and
their order as stored on the blockchain. Because of this, blockchain is often referred to
as a distributed ledger.
Blockchain transactions. A transaction in a blockchain is the same as in traditional
database: a sequence of operations applied to some states. As such, a blockchain trans-
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Figure 1.1: Blockchain data structure for Bitcoin. Transactions are kept outside of the block
header.
der consideration. Current transactional, distributed databases [17, 55] employ classic
concurrency control techniques such as two-phase commit to ensure ACID. They can
achieve high performance, because of the simple failure model, i.e. crash failure. In
contrast, the original blockchain design considers a much hostile environment in which
nodes are Byzantine and they are free to join and leave. Under this model, the overhead
of concurrency control is much higher [13].
Bitcoin. In Bitcoin [46], the states are digital coins (crypto-currency) available in
the network. A Bitcoin transaction moves coins from one set of addresses to another
set of addresses. Each node broadcasts a set of transactions it wants to perform. Special
nodes called miners collect transactions into blocks, check for their validity, and start
a consensus protocol to append the blocks onto the blockchain. Figure 1.1 shows the
blockchain data structure, in which each block is linked to its predecessor via a crypto-
graphic pointer, all the way back to the first (genesis) block. Bitcoin uses proof-of-work
(PoW) for consensus: only a miner which has successfully solved a computationally
hard puzzle (finding the right nonce for the block header) can append to the blockchain.



































Figure 1.2: Blockchain software stack on a fully validating node. A non-validating node stores
only the block headers. Different blockchain platforms offer different interfaces between the
blockchain and application layer.
two blocks are appended at the same time, creating a fork in the blockchain. Bitcoin re-
solves this by only considering a block as confirmed after it is followed by a number of
blocks (typically six blocks). This probabilistic guarantee causes both security and per-
formance issues: attacks have been demonstrated by an adversary controlling only 25%
of the nodes [25], and Bitcoin transaction throughput remains very low (7 transactions
per second [18]).
Ethereum. Due to simple transaction semantics, Bitcoin nodes execute a very sim-
ple state machine pre-built into the protocol. Ethereum [2] extends Bitcoin to support
user-defined and Turing complete state machines. In particular, Ethereum blockchain
lets the user define any complex computations in the form of smart contracts. Once de-
ployed, the smart contract is executed on all Ethereum nodes as a replicated state ma-























Figure 1.3: An example of smart contract, written in Solidity language, for a pyramid scheme on
Ethereum.
smart contract has access to its own states. Figure 1.2 shows the software stack in a typi-
cal Ethereum node: a fully validating node contains the entire history of the blockchain,
whereas a non-validating node stores only the block headers. One key difference with
Bitcoin is that smart contract states are maintained as well as normal transactions. In
fact, a smart contract is identified by a unique address which has its own money bal-
ance (in Ether), and upon retrieving a transaction to its address, it executes the contract’s
logics. Ethereum comes with an execution engine, called Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM), to execute smart contracts. Figure 1.3 shows a snippet of popular contract run-
ning on Ethereum, which implements a pyramid scheme: users send money to this con-
tract which is used to pay interests to early participants. This contract has its own states,
namely the list of participants, and exports a function called enter. A user invokes this
contract by sending his money through a transaction, which is accessed by the smart
contract as msg.sender and msg.amount.
Private blockchain. Ethereum uses the same consensus protocol as Bitcoin does,
though with different parameters. In fact, 90% of public blockchain systems employ
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variants of the proof-of-work protocol. PoW is non-deterministic and computationally
expensive, both rendering it unsuitable for applications such as banking and finance
which must handle a lot of transactions in a deterministic manner. Recent blockchain
systems, e.g., Hyperledger, consider restricted settings wherein nodes are authenticated.
Although PoW is still useful in such permissioned environments, as in the case of Ethereum,
there are more efficient and deterministic solutions where node identities are known.
Distributed fault-tolerant consensus in such a closed settings is a well-studied topic in
distributed systems. Zab [35], Raft [48], Paxos [38], PBFT [13] are popular protocols
that are in active use today. Recent permissioned blockchains either use existing PBFT,
as in Hyperledger [32], or develop their own variants, as in Parity [23], Ripple [53], and
ErisDB [6]. Most of these systems support smart contracts, though in different lan-
guages, with different APIs and execution engines (see a more comprehensive com-
parison in the Appendix). As a result, permissioned blockchains can execute complex
application more efficiently than PoW-based blockchains, while being Byzantine fault
tolerant. These properties and the commercial interests of major banking and financial
institutions have bestowed on private blockchains the potentials to disrupt the current
practice in data management.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we propose the first benchmarking framework, called BLOCKBENCH, for
evaluating private blockchain systems. Specifically, our contributions can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We present the first benchmark for understanding and comparing the performance
of permissioned blockchain systems. BLOCKBENCH contains workloads for mea-
suring the data processing performance and workloads for understanding the per-
formance at different layers of the blockchain. This framework is released as open
source for public use.
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• Using BLOCKBENCH, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of three major blockchain
systems, namely Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger with two macro benchmarks
and four micro benchmarks.
• Our empirical results present concrete evidence of blockchain’s limitation in han-
dling data processing workloads and reveal bottlenecks in the three systems. The
results serve as a baseline for further development of blockchain technologies.
• We demonstrate several bottlenecks and design trade-offs at different layers of the
software stack.
1.4 Synopsis
• Chapter 2 reviews the related works, including system benchmark designs, secu-
rity and performance studies on public blockchains.
• Chapter 3 describes BLOCKBENCH design and implementation.
• Chapter 4 presents our comparative performance studies of three systems.
• We discuss lessons learned from the results and potentials to bring database tech-





Driven by vendors’ needs to compare commercial database systems, the Transaction
Processing Performance Council developed a series of end-to-end data warehouse bench-
mark suites under the requirement for measure the performance of DBMS to handle
large volume data emerged. In the beginning of 1990’s they started with TPC-D in the
beginning, then TPC-H and TPC-R near the end of the 19-th century (specifications
available from TPC official website1). These benchmarks, more emphasize the perfor-
mance of capabilities for complex SQL query processing of an enterprise data ware-
house in the relational database model.
As data volumes grew over time to petabytes and data models grew from a small
number of tables with few relationships with a large number of tables with many com-
plex relationships, the TPC developed TPC-DS [47] in the early 2000’s as a decision
support benchmark. It covers the major three disciplines in the life-cycle of a relational
decision support benchmark, namely (i) preloading the database to an initial state (ii) ex-
ecuting queries from both single user or multi-tenants (iii) updating the database. Still,
it focuses on the relational data model and contains a concurrent update model and very
1http://www.tpc.org
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complex analytical queries using sophisticated SQL structures.
Meanwhile, emerging big data companies, as well as academia, have started defin-
ing the next generation big data benchmarks for cloud computing. Yahoo! developed its
cloud serving benchmark called YCSB, to evaluate NoSQL data stores [15]. It is a flex-
ible multiuser benchmark with two tiers, a performance tier and a scalability tier. In the
original YCSB paper, they use three data storage systems as a case study, i.e., HBase,
Cassandra, PNUTs, and MySQL. Several following benchmark designs extended the
scope of YCSB [50, 52]. Also, some other works [34, 51] defined benchmarks or big
data analytics based on MapReduce paper from Google and compared Hadoop with
RDBMS systems. The TeraSort (or GraySort) benchmark [29] is another wildly used
benchmark for Hadoop-like systems which is a micro-benchmark that does a consider-
able amount of networking, storage I/O and CPU heavy computation by sorting a large
number of 100-byte records. The GridMix [3] and PigMix [7] are also designed to test
MapReduce-based systems. Bigbench [28] is designed as an industry standard end-to-
end big data processing benchmark which covers a product retailer business model and a
synthetic data generator.
In summary, previous benchmarks described in this section are mostly micro and
macro benchmarks. They all focus on either conventional relational data processing sys-
tems or big data processing, a benchmark suite designed devoting to blockchain system
is lacking.
2.2 Security and Peformance Studies on Public Blockchains
Increasing adoption of cryptocurrencies has raised concerns about their ability to scale.
As a result, the cryptocurrency and security community has been discussing techniques
for improving the scalability of blockchain in general for some time. Based on [18],
to guarantee an acceptable security and fairness level, in public proof-of-work setting
like Bitcoin, the maximum throughput of at most 27 transactions/sec, and the latency of
11
block propagation should not be smaller than 12 seconds, under nowaday peer-to-peer
overlay network. That is to say, public blockchain has the intrinsic performance limita-
tion.
Gervais et al. [27] introduced a quantitative framework to compare PoW blockchains
and evaluate the impact of network-layer parameters on security. Based on the result
from this work, PoW blockchains can achieve a throughput of 60 transactions per sec-
ond without significantly affecting the blockchain’s security.
Noting the fact that PoW blockchains have inherent performance limitation, several
works try to redesign the PoW protocol to gain better performance on blockchains.
Improving the performance of PoW blockchains. Sompolinski and Zohar recently
proposed the GHOST (Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree) rule [54], which resolves
conflicts by weighing the subtrees rooted in blocks rather than the longest chain rooted
in given blocks in a PoW blockchain network. Later, a simplified version of this rule
realized in the Ethereum platform [2], however, the GHOST-PoW performance has not
yet been fully stress tested with high loads (so far, typical Ethereum throughput is fewer
than 20,000 transactions per day, i.e., about 0.2 tx/s on average).
Bitcoin-NG proposed by Eyal et al. [24] that uses standard PoW for leader election,
declaring a node which mines a block to become a leader within one consensus epoch.
After selected, the leader node can propose microblocks to the chain, which are not sub-
ject to PoW mining but are merely hash-linked together and contain the actual transac-
tion data. As such, microblocks considerably increase the throughput of the whole sys-
tem and decrease the latency. Consequently, however, forks are still possible in Bitcoin-
NG and consensus finality is not still guaranteed.
Scaling blockchain through parallelization. Scaling blockchain by rendering it a
blockDAG (directed acyclic graph) rather than a linear chain of blocks, was recently
proposed by Lewenberg et al. in the context of PoW [39]. Their idea is to allow non-
conflicting transactions (e.g., those transactions that do not constitute double-spending
attempts) to be initially on different forks but to eventually merge the forks by mining a
12
block that would include them both in the ledger.
By leveraging parallelization of execution of independent requests, the traditional
Byzantine Fault Tolerance and state-machine replication communities have also been
intensively exploring the idea of parallel replication for a few years. [36, 43].
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed related work for existing system benchmark designs,
performance and security study on public blockchain systems and current storage sys-
tem design trends. A combination of micro- and macro-workload in benchmark design





We start by discussing blockchain’s common layers of abstractions which BLOCK-
BENCH is designed to benchmark, followed by high-level implementation of the frame-
work. We then explain BLOCKBENCH’s workloads in detail.
3.1 Blockchain Layers
There are many choices of blockchains: over 200 Bitcoin variants, Ethereum, and other
permissioned blockchains. To meaningfully compare them, we identify four abstraction
layers found in all of these systems (Figure 3.1) and design our workloads to target these
layers. The consensus layer contains protocols via which a block is considered appended
to the blockchain. The data layer contains the structure, content, and operations on the
blockchain data. The execution layer includes details of the runtime environment sup-
port blockchain operations. Finally, the application layer includes classes of blockchain
applications. In a related work, Croman et. al. [18] proposed to divide blockchain into
several planes: network, consensus, storage, view, and side plane. While similar to our
four layers, the plane abstractions were geared towards crypto-currency applications and
did not take into account the execution of smart contracts. Our layers model more accu-


























Figure 3.1: Abstraction layers in blockchain, and the corresponding workloads in BLOCK-
BENCH.
3.1.1 Consensus
The role of the consensus layer is to get all nodes in the system to agree on the blockchain
content. That is, if a node appends (or commits) a block, the other nodes also append
the same block to their copy of the blockchain. Protocols for reaching consensus in the
crash-failure model play a key role in distributed databases, wherein nodes agree on a
global transaction order. Blockchain systems, on the other hand, employ a spectrum of
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols [58].
At one extreme, Ethereum, like Bitcoin, uses proof-of-work whose difficulty is agreed
upon and adjusted gradually to achieve a rate of (currently) one block per 14s (Bitcoin’s
difficulty achieves a rate of one block per 10m). In essence, proof-of-work selects at
each round a random node which can append a block, where the probability of being se-
lected is determined by the node’s total computing power. This simple scheme works
against Sybil attack [21] - a common attack in open, decentralized environments in
which the adversary can acquire multiple identities. However, it consumes a lot of en-
ergy and computing power, as nodes spend their CPU cycles solving puzzles instead
of doing otherwise useful works. Worse still, it does not guarantee safety: two nodes
may both be selected to append to the blockchain, and both blocks can be accepted. This
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causes forks in the blockchain, and most PoW-based systems add additional rules, for
example, only blocks on the longest chain are considered accepted. Ethereum, in partic-
ular, adopts a PoW variant called GHOST [54] which accepts blocks in heavy branches.
In any case, a block can be confirmed as part of the blockchain only with some high
probability.
At the other extreme, Hyperledger uses the classic PBFT protocol, which is commu-
nication bound: O(N2) where N is the number of nodes. PBFT can tolerate fewer than
N
3
failures, and works in three phases in which nodes broadcast messages to each other.
First, the pre-prepare phase selects a leader which chooses a value to commit. Next, the
prepare phase broadcasts the value to be validated. Finally, the commit phase waits for
more than two third of the nodes to confirm before announcing that the value is com-
mitted. PBFT has been shown to achieve liveness and safety properties in a partially
asynchronous model [13], thus, unlike PoW, once the block is appended it is confirmed
immediately. It can tolerate more failures than PoW (which is shown to be vulnerable to
25% attacks [25]). However, PBFT assumes that node identities are known, therefore it
can only work in the permissioned settings. Additionally, the protocol is unlikely to be
able to scale to the network size of Ethereum, because of its communication overhead.
In between, there are various hybrid designs that combine both scalability of PoW
and safety property of PBFT [49]. For example, Bitcoin-NG [24] decouples consen-
sus from transaction validation by using PoW for leader election who can then append
more than one block at a time. Similarly, Byzcoin [37] and Elastico [41] leverage PoW
to determine random, smaller consensus groups which run PBFT. Another example is
the Tendermint protocol, adopted by ErisDB [6], which combines proof-of-stake (PoS)
and PBFT. Unlike PoW, PoS selects a node which can append a block by its investment
(or stake) in the system, therefore avoid expending CPU resources. Parity [23] imple-
ments a simplified version of PoS called Proof of Authority (or PoA). In this protocol,
a set of authorities are pre-determined and each authority is assigned a fixed time slot
within which it can generate blocks. PoA makes a strong assumption that the authorities
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are trusted, and therefore is only suitable for private deployment.
3.1.2 Data model
In Bitcoin, transactions are first-class citizens: they are system states representing digital
coins in the network. Private blockchains depart from this model, by focusing on ac-
counts. One immediate benefit is simplicity, especially for applications involving crypto-
currencies. For instance, transferring money from one user to another in Bitcoin involves
searching for transactions belonging to the sender, then marking some of them as spent,
whereas it is easily done in Ethereum by updating two accounts in one transaction. An
account in Ethereum has a balance as its state, and is updated upon receiving a trans-
action. A special type of account, called smart contract, contains executable code and
private states (Figure 1.2). When receiving a transaction, in addition to updating its bal-
ance, the contract’s code is invoked with arguments specified in the transaction. The
code can read the states of other non-contract accounts, and it can send new transactions
during execution. Parity adopts the same data model as in Ethereum. In Hyperledger,
there is only one type of account called chaincode which is the same as Ethereum’s
contract. Chaincode can only access its private storage and they are isolated from each
other.
A block contains a list of transactions, and a list of smart contracts executed as well
as their latest states. Each block is identified by the cryptographic hash of its content,
and linked to the previous block’s identity. In Parity, the entire block content is kept
in memory. In Ethereum and Hyperledger, the content is organized in a two-layered
data structure. The states are stored in a disk-based key-value storage (LevelDB [5] in
Ethereum and RocksDB [8] in Hyperledger), and organized in a hash tree whose root is
included in the block header. Ethereum caches the states in memory, while Hyperledger
outsources its data management entirely to the storage engine. Only states affected by
the block’s transactions are recorded in the root hash. The hash tree for transaction list
is a classic Merkle tree, as the list is not large. On the other hand, different Merkle tree
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variants are used for the state tree. Ethereum and Parity employ Patricia-Merkle tree
that supports efficient update and search operations. Hyperledger implements Bucket-
Merkle tree which uses a hash function to group states into a list of buckets from which
a Merkle tree is built.
Block headers and the key-value storage together maintain all the historical transac-
tions and states of the blockchain. For validating and executing transactions, a blockchain
node needs only a few recent blocks (or just the latest block for PBFT-based systems).
However, the node also interacts via some RPC-like mechanisms with light-weight
clients who do not have the entire blockchain. Such external interfaces enable building
of third-party applications on top of blockchain. Current systems support a minimum set
of queries including getting blocks and transactions based on their IDs. Ethereum and
Parity expose a more comprehensive set of APIs via JSON-RPC, supporting queries of
account states at specific blocks and of other block statistics.
3.1.3 Execution layer
A contract (or chaincode) is executed in a runtime environment. One requirement is that
the execution must be fast, because there are multiple contracts and transactions in one
block and they must all be verified by the node. Another is that the execution must be
deterministic, ideally the same at all nodes. Deterministic execution avoids unnecessary
inconsistency in transaction input and output which leads to blocks being aborted. In
both PoW and PBFT, aborting transactions wastes computing resources.
Ethereum develops its own machine language (bytecode) and a virtual machine (called
EVM) for executing the code, which is also adopted by Parity. EVM is optimized for
Ethereum-specific operations. For example, every code instruction executed in Ethereum
costs a certain amount of gas, and the total cost must be properly tracked and charged to
the transaction’s sender. Furthermore, the code must keep track of intermediate states
and reverse them if the execution runs out of gas. Hyperledger, in contrast, does not
consider these semantics in its design, so it simply supports running of compiled ma-
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chine codes inside Docker images. Specifically, chaincodes are deployed as Docker im-
ages interacting with Hyperledger’s backend via pre-defined interfaces. One advantage
of Hyperledger’s environment is that it supports multiple high-level programming lan-
guages such as Go and Java, as opposed to Ethereum’s own language. In terms of devel-
opment environment, Hyperledger exposes only simple key-value operations, namely
putState and getState. This is restricted, because any contract states must be
mapped into key-value tuples. In contrast, Ethereum and Parity support a richer set of
data types such as map, array, and composite structures. These high-level data types in
Ethereum and Parity make it easier and faster to develop new contracts.
3.1.4 Application layer
Many applications are being proposed for blockchain, leveraging the latter’s two key
properties. First, data in the blockchain is immutable and transparent to the participants,
meaning that once a record is appended, it can never be changed. Second, it is resilient
to dishonest and malicious participants. Even in permissioned settings, participants can
be mutually distrustful. The most popular application, however, is still crypto-currency.
Ethereum has its own currency (Ether) and a majority of smart contracts running on it
are currency related. Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) is the most ac-
tive application in Ethereum, creating communities for crowd funding, exchange, in-
vestment, or any other decentralized activities. A DAO manages funds contributed by
participants and gives its users voting power proportional to their contributions. Parity’s
main application is the wallet application that manages Ether. As major banks are now
considering adopting crypto-currency, some fintech companies are building applications
that take crypto-currency to mediate financial transactions, for example, in currency ex-
change market [53]. Other examples include applying the currency and smart contracts
for more transparent and cost-effective asset management [44, 45].
Some applications propose to build on blockchain’s immutability and transparency
for better application workflows in which humans are the bottlenecks. For example, se-
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curity settlements and insurance processes can be sped up by storing data on the blockchain [30].
Another example is sharing economy applications, such as AirBnB, which can use blockchain
to evaluate reputation and trust in a decentralized setting, because historical activities of
any users are available and immutable. This also extends to Internet of Things settings,
where devices need to establish trust among each other [4].
3.1.5 Survey of Blockchain Platforms
We compare eleven promising blockchain platforms in Table 3.1. We can see that all but
Ripple support smart contracts. Ethereum, Eris-DB, Dfinity and Parity execute the con-
tracts using Ehtereum Virtual Machine (EVM), whereas Corda runs them in Java Virtual
Machine (JVM). Hyperledger, Stellar and Tezos employ Docker images, ScalableBFT
takes Haskell execution environment, and Sawtooth Lake launches contracts on top of
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX).
These platforms also support different languages to develop smart contracts. For exam-
ple, Solidity, Serpent and LLL are mainly used in Ethereum, Dfinity and Parity, while
Eris-DB only supports Solidity. Hyperledger, Stellar, Corda and Sawtooth Lake exploit
various mature programming languages, such as Python, Java, Golang, etc. ScalableBFT
and Tezos even develop their own smart contract languages. Most blockchain platforms’
data models are account-based. Two exceptions in the table are Ripple and Corda. Their
data models are similar to Bitcoin’s unspent transaction outputs (UTXO) which repre-
sent the coins in the network.
Each platform offers different consensus protocols. Hyperledger implements PBFT
in the version we evaluated, while Ethereum implements a variation of PoW (Proof-
of-Work). Eris-DB builds on top of Tendermint protocol but only works in the latest
version (v 0.12). Ripple and Tezos deploy Proof-of-Stake (PoS) schemes (the one in
Ripple is referred to Ripple Consensus Ledger) where the next block is created based
on accounts’ wealth, i.e., the stake. Parity takes another consensus protocol, Proof-of-
Authority (PoA), which holds a predefined set of ”authorities” to create new blocks
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Figure 3.2: BLOCKBENCH software stack. New workloads are added by implementing
IWorkloadConnector interface. New blockchain backends are added by implementing
IBlockchainConnector
.
in a fixed time slot and secure the blockchain network. Sawtooth Lake uses Proof-of-
Elapsed-Time (PoET) as its consensus protocol, which in nature is a lottery algorithm
and decides the creator of block arbitrarily. Stellar develops its own mechanism, Stel-
lar Consensus Protocol, which is a construction for decentralized Byzantine agreement.
There is no source code that helps determine which consensus protocol Dfinity uses, but
its documents suggest that a Blockchain Nervous System will govern the whole plat-
form via a voting mechanism based on neurons that interact with each other and are con-
trolled by users.
3.2 BLOCKBENCH Implementation
Figure 3.2 illustrates the current BLOCKBENCH’s implementation. To evaluate a blockchain
system, the first step is to integrate the blockchain into the framework’s backend by
implementing IBlockchainConnector interface. The interface contains opera-
tions for deploying applications, invoking it by sending a transaction, and for querying
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the blockchain’s states. Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger are current backends sup-
ported by BLOCKBENCH, while ErisDB integration is under development. A user can
use one of the existing workloads (discussed next) to evaluate the blockchain, or imple-
ment a new workload using the IWorkloadConnector interface (we assume that the
smart contract handling the workload’s logic is already implemented and deployed on
the blockchain). This interface essentially wraps the workload’s operations into trans-
actions to be sent to the blockchain. Specifically, it has a getNextTransaction
method which returns a new blockchain transaction. BLOCKBENCH’s core component
is the Driver which takes as input a workload, user-defined configuration (the num-
ber of operations, the number of clients, threads, etc.), executes it on the blockchain and
outputs running statistics.
Asynchronous Driver. One challenge in implementing the Driver is that current
blockchain systems are asynchronous services, meaning that transactions submitted
to the systems are processed at a later time. This is in contrast to databases, especially
transactional databases, in which operations are synchronous, i.e. they block until the
systems finish processing. When a transaction is submitted, Ethereum, Parity, and Hy-
perledger return a transaction ID which can be used for checking the transaction status
at a later time. Such asynchronous semantics could result in better performance, but it
forces the Driver to periodically poll for the status of the submitted requests. In par-
ticular, Driver maintains a queue of outstanding transactions that have not been con-
firmed. New transaction IDs are added to the queue by worker threads. A polling thread
periodically invokes getLatestBlock(h) method in the IBlockchainConnector
interface, which returns a list of new confirmed blocks on the blockchain from a given
height h. Ethereum and Parity consider a block as confirmed if it is at least confirmationLength
blocks from the current blockchain’s tip, whereas Hyperledger confirms a block as soon
as it appears on the blockchain. The Driver then extracts transaction lists from the
confirmed blocks’ content and removes matching ones in the local queue. getLatestBlock(h)
can be implemented in all three systems by first requesting for the blockchain’s current
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tip t, then requesting the content of all blocks in the range (h, t]. ErisDB provides a pub-
lish/subscribe interface that could simplify the implementation of this function.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
The output statistics of running a workload with different configurations can be used to
evaluate the blockchain against three performance metrics.
• Throughput: measured as the number of successful transactions per second. A
workload can be configured with multiple clients and threads per clients to satu-
rate the blockchain throughput.
• Latency: measured as the response time per transaction. Driver implements
blocking transaction, i.e. it waits for one transaction to finish before starting an-
other.
• Scalability: measured as the changes in throughput and latency when increasing
number of nodes and number of concurrent workloads.
• Fault tolerance: measured as how the throughput and latency change during node
failure. Although blockchain systems are tolerant against Byzantine failure, it is
not possible to simulate all Byzantine behaviors. In BLOCKBENCH we simulate
three failure modes: crash failure in which a node simply stops, network delay in
which we inject arbitrary delays into messages, and random response in which we
corrupt the messages exchanged among the nodes.
Security metrics. A special case of Byzantine failures that is important to blockchain
systems is malicious behavior caused by an attacker. The attacker can be a compro-
mised node or rouge participant within the system. Under this threat model, security
of a blockchain is defined as the safety property of the underlying consensus protocol.
In particular, security means that the non-Byzantine nodes have the same blockchain
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data. Violation of the safety property leads to forks in the blockchain. Classic Byzan-
tine tolerant protocols such as PBFT are proven to ensure safety for a certain number
of failures, thus security is guaranteed. On the other hand, in PoW systems like Bit-
coin or Ethereum, forks can occur due to network delays causing two nodes to mine the
same blocks. While such accidental forks can be quickly resolved, forks engineered by
the attackers can be used for double spending and selfish mining. In the former, the at-
tacker sends a transaction to a block in the fork, waits for it to be accepted by the users,
then sends a conflicting transaction to another block in the main branch. In the latter,
by withholding blocks and maintaining a private, long fork, the attacker disrupts the
incentives for mining and forces other participants to join the attacker’s coalition. By
compromising 25% of the nodes, the attacker can control the entire network’s block gen-
eration [25].
In this work, we quantify security as the number of blocks in the forks. Such blocks,
called orphan or stale blocks, represent the window of vulnerability in which the at-
tacker can perform double spending or selfish mining. To manipulate forks, the key
strategy is to isolate a group of nodes, i.e. to partition the network. For example, eclipse
attack [31] exploits the application-level protocol to surround the targeted nodes with
ones under the attacker’s control. At the network level, BGP hijacking [9] requires con-
trolling as few as 900 prefixes to isolate 50% of the Bitcoin’s total mining power. BLOCK-
BENCH implements a simulation of these attacks by partitioning the network for a given
duration. In particular, during partition BLOCKBENCH runtime drops network traffic
between any two nodes in the two partitions. Security is then measured by the ratio be-
tween the total number of blocks included in the main branch and the total number of
blocks confirmed by the users. The lower the ratio, the less vulnerable the system is





EtherId Name registrar contract
Doubler Ponzi scheme
WavesPresale Crowd sale
VersionKVStore Keep state’s versions (Hyperledger only)
IOHeavy Read and write a lot of data
CPUHeavy Sort a large array
DoNothing Simple contract, do nothing
Table 3.2: Summary of smart contracts implemented in BLOCKBENCH. Each contract has one
Solidity version for Parity and Ethereum, and one Golang version for Hyperledger.
3.4 Workloads
We divide the workloads into two major categories: macro benchmark for evaluating the
performance of the application layer, and micro benchmark for testing the lower layers.
We have implemented the smart contracts for all workloads for Ethereum, Parity, and
Hyperledger, whose details are summarized in Table 3.2. Ethereum and Parity use the
same execution model, therefore they share the same smart contract implementations.
3.4.1 Macro benchmark workloads
We port two popular database benchmark workloads into BLOCKBENCH, and three
other real workloads found in the Ethereum blockchain.
Key-value storage. We implement a simple smart contract which functions as a key-
value storage. The WorkloadClient is based on the YCSB driver [16]. It preloads
each store with a number of records, and supports requests with different ratios of read
and write operations. YCSB is widely used for evaluating NoSQL databases.
OLTP (Smallbank). Unlike YCSB which does not consider transactions, Small-
bank [12] is a popular benchmark for OLTP workload. It consists of three tables and
four basic procedures simulating basic operations on bank accounts. We implement it as
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a smart contract which simply transfers money from one account to another.
EtherId. This is a popular contract that implements a domain name registrar. It sup-
ports creation, modification and ownership transfer of domain names. A user can request
an existing domain by paying a certain amount to the current domain’s owner. This con-
tract has been written for Ethereum blockchain, and can be ported to Parity without
change. In Hyperledger, we create two different key-value namespaces in the contract:
one for storing the domain name data structures, and another for users’ account bal-
ances. In domain creation, the contract simply inserts domain value into the first name
space, using the domain name as the key. For ownership transfer, it checks the second
namespace if the requester has sufficient fund before updating the first namespace. To
simulate real workloads, the contract contains a function to pre-allocate user accounts
with certain balances.
Doubler. This is a contract that implements a pyramid scheme. As shown in Fig-
ure 1.3, participants send money to this contract, and get rewards as more people join
the scheme. In addition to the list of participants and their contributions, the contract
needs to keep the index of the next payout and updates the balance accordingly after
paying early participants. Similar to EthereId, this contract has already been written for
Ethereum, and can be ported to Parity directly. To implement it in Hyperledger, we need
to translate the list operations into key-value semantics, making the chaincode more
bulky than the Ethereum counterpart.
WavesPresale. This contract supports digital token sales. It maintains two states: the
total number of tokens sold so far, and the list of previous sale transactions. It supports
operations to add a new sale, to transfer ownership of a previous sale, and to query a
specific sale record. Ethereum and Parity support composite structure data types, mak-
ing it straightforward to implement the application logic. In contrast, in Hyperledger,
we have to translate this structure into key-value semantics by using separate key-value
namespaces.
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3.4.2 Micro benchmark workloads
The previous workloads test the performance of blockchain as a whole. As discussed
early in this section, a blockchain system comprises multiple layers, and each layer
may have different impacts on the overall performance. We design several workloads
to stress the layers in order to understand their individual performance.
DoNothing. This contract accepts transaction as input and simply returns. In other
words, it involves minimal number of operations at the execution layer and data model
layer, thus the overall performance will be mainly determined by the consensus layer.
Previous works on the performance of blockchain consensus protocol [37, 49] use time
to consensus to measure its performance. In BLOCKBENCH, this metric is directly re-
flected in the transaction latency.
Analytics. This workload considers the performance of blockchain system in an-
swering analytical queries about the historical data. Similar to an OLAP benchmark, this
workload evaluates how the system implements scan-like and aggregate queries, which
are determined by its data model. Specifically, we implement two queries for extracting
statistics from the blockchain data:
Q1: Compute the total transaction values committed between block i and block j.
Q2: Compute the largest transaction value involving a given state (account) between
block i and block j.
In ClientWorkload, we pre-load the blockchain with transactions carrying inte-
ger values (representing money transferring) and the states with integer values. For
Ethereum, both queries can be implemented via JSON-RPC APIs that return transaction
details and account balances at a specific block. For Hyperledger, however, the second
query must be implemented via a chaincode (VersionKVStore), because the system does
not have APIs to query historical states.
IOHeavy. Current blockchain systems rely on key-value storage to persist blockchain
transactions and states. Each storage system may perform differently under different
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workloads [59]. This workload is designed to evaluate the IO performance by invoking
a contract that performs a large number of random writes and random reads to the con-
tract’s states. The I/O bandwidth can be estimated via the observed transaction latency.
CPUHeavy. This workload measures the efficiency of the execution layer for compu-
tationally heavy tasks. EVM may be fast at executing Ethereum specific operations, but
it is unclear how it performs on general tasks for which machine native codes may be
more efficient. We deploy a smart contract which initializes a large array, and runs the
quick sort algorithm over it. The execution layer performance can then be measured by




We selected Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger for our study, as they occupy different
positions in the blockchain design space, and also for their codebase maturity. We evalu-
ate the three systems using both macro and micro benchmark workloads described in the
previous section1. Our main findings are:
• Hyperledger performs consistently better than Ethereum and Parity across the
benchmarks. But it fails to scale up to more than 16 nodes.
• Ethereum and Parity are more resilient to node failures, but they are vulnerable to
security attacks that fork the blockchain.
• The main bottlenecks in Hyperledger and Ethereum are the consensus protocols,
but for Parity the bottleneck is caused by transaction signing.
• Ethereum and Parity incur large overhead in terms of memory and disk usage.
Their execution engine is also less efficient than that of Hyperledger.
• Hyperledger’s data model is low level, but its flexibility enables customized opti-
mization for analytical queries of the blockchain data.
We used the popular Go implementation of Ethereum, geth v1.4.18, the Parity release
v1.6.0 and the Hyperledger Fabric release v0.6.0-preview. We set up a private testnet for
1We have released BLOCKBENCH for public use [1].
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Ethereum and Parity by defining a genesis block and directly adding peers to the miner
network. For Ethereum, we manually tuned the difficulty variable in the gene-
sis block to ensure that miners do not diverge in large networks. For Parity, we set the
stepDuration variable to 1. In both Ethereum and Parity, confirmationLength
is set to 5 seconds. The default batch size in Hyperledger is 500.
The experiments were run on a 48-node commodity cluster. Each node has an E5-
1650 3.5GHz CPU, 32GB RAM, 2TB hard drive, running Ubuntu 14.04 Trusty, and
connected to the other nodes via 1GB switch. The results below are averaged over 5
independent runs. For Ethereum, we reserved 8 cores out of the available 12 cores per
machine, so that the periodical polls from the client’s driver process do not interfere with
the mining process (which is CPU intensive).
4.1 Macro benchmarks
This section discusses the performance of the blockchain systems at the application
layer, by running them with the YCSB and Smallbank benchmarks over multiple nodes.
4.1.1 Throughput and latency
We measured peak performance of the three systems with 8 servers and 8 concurrent
clients over the period of 5 minutes. Each client sends transactions to a server with a re-
quest rate varying from 8 tx/s to 1024 tx/s. Figure 4.1 shows the throughput and latency
at peak, and Figure 4.2 shows how these metrics change with varying transaction rates.
We observe that in terms of throughput, Hyperledger outperforms other systems in
both benchmarks. Specifically, it has up to 5.5x and 28x higher throughput than Ethereum
and Parity respectively. Parity has the lowest latency and Ethereum has the highest. The
gap between Hyperledger and Ethereum is because of the difference in consensus pro-
tocol: one is based on PBFT while the other is based on PoW. We measured CPU and

































Figure 4.1: BLOCKBENCH Peak performance of blockchains with 8 clients and 8 servers.
.
nication bound whereas Ethereum is CPU bound. Figure 4.3 compares CPU and net-
work utilization of the three systems over the period of 100 seconds. It is easy to see
that Ethereum is CPU bound, as it fully utilizes 8 CPU cores. Hyperledger, on the other
hand, uses CPU sparingly and spends the rest of the time on network communication.
Parity, in contrast, has lower resource footprints than other two systems. For Ethereum
and Hyperledger, the pattern is the direct consequence of the consensus protocol: PoW
is CPU bound whereas PBFT is communication bound. At 8 servers, communication
cost in broadcasting messages is much cheaper than block mining whose difficulty is set
at roughly 2.5s per block.
The performance gap between Parity and Hyperledger is not because of the consen-
sus protocol, as we expect Parity’s PoA protocol to be simpler and more efficient than
both PoW and PBFT (indeed, we observe that Parity has the same CPU utilization and
lower network utilization than Hyperledger). Figure 4.2 shows that Parity’s through-
put and latency remain constant with increasing transaction rates (beyond 40 tx/s). To
understand its performance further, we measure the queue of pending transactions at
the client. Figure 4.4 compares the queue sizes before and after the systems reach their
peak throughput. With only 8 tx/s, the queues for Ethereum and Hyperledger remain
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Figure 4.2: BLOCKBENCH Performance with varying request rates of blockchains with 8 clients
and 8 servers.
.
at roughly constant sizes, but Parity’s queue size increases as time passes. More inter-
estingly, under high loads (512 tx/s per client), Parity’s queue is always smaller than
Ethereum’s and Hyperledger’s. This behavior indicates that Parity processes transac-
tions at a constant rate, and that it enforces a maximum client request rate at around 80
tx/s. As a consequence, Parity achieves both lower throughput and latency than other
systems.
Another observation is that there are differences between YCSB and Smallbank work-
loads in Hyperledger and Ethereum. There is a drop of 10% in throughput and 20% in-
crease in latency. Since executing a Smallbank smart contract is more expensive than
executing a YCSB contract (there are more reading and writing to the blockchain’s
states), the results suggest that there are non-negligible costs in the execution layer of
blockchains.
At its peak throughput, Hyperledger generates 3.1 blocks per second and achieves the
overall throughput of 1273 tx/s. We remark that this throughput is far lower than what an
in-memory database system can deliver (see Section 4.1.4 for more details).
As the throughput is a function of the block sizes and block generation rate, we mea-
sured the effect of increasing the block sizes in the three systems. Figure 4.5 shows the
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Figure 4.3: Resource utilization.
effect of varying block sizes in the overall throughput. While it is straightforward to set
the block size in Hyperledger by configuring the batchSize variable, there is no di-
rect way to specify the same in Ethereum. An Ethereum miner uses gasLimit value
to restrict the overall cost in constructing a block, thus we tuned this value to simulate
different sizes. In Parity, gasLimit is not applicable to local transaction and it has
no effect on the block size. Instead, we observe that the block size can be controlled by
tuning stepDuration value, which essentially decides how much time a validator
can use to build a block. In the experiments, medium size refers to the default settings,
whereas large and small refer to 2x and 0.5x of the default size. The results demonstrate
that with bigger block sizes, the block generation rate decreases proportionally, thus the
overall throughput does not improve.
Figure 4.6 shows the latency distribution. Ethereum has both higher latency and
higher variance, because PoW is a randomized process which means the duration be-
tween blocks are unpredictable. Parity has the lowest variance because the server re-
stricts the client request rate at 80 tx/s.
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Figure 4.5: Block generation rate.
4.1.2 Scalability
We fixed the client request rate and increased both the number of clients and the number
of servers. Figure 4.7 illustrates how well the three systems scale to handle larger YCSB
workloads (the results for Smallbank are similar. Parity’s performance remains constant
as the network size and offered load increase, due to the constant transaction process-
ing rate at the servers. Interestingly, while Ethereum’s throughput and latency degrade
almost linearly beyond 8 servers, Hyperledger stops working beyond 16 servers.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the scalability of the three systems using the Smallbank bench-
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Figure 4.7: Performance scalability (with the same number of clients and servers).
mark. We observe similar patterns to the YCSB benchmark (Figure 4.7), except that
Hyperledger failed to scale beyond 8 nodes instead of 16.
To understand why Hyperledger failed to scale beyond 16 servers and 16 clients, we
examined the system’s logs and found that the nodes were repeatedly trying and fail-
ing to reach consensus on new views which contain batches of transactions. In fact,
the servers were in different views and consequently were receiving conflicting view
change messages from the rest of the network. Further investigation reveals that con-
flicting views occurred because the consensus messages are rejected by other peers on
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Figure 4.8: Scalability with Smallbank benchmark.
account of the message channel being full. As messages are dropped, the views start to
diverge and lead to unreachable consensus. In fact, we also observe that as time passes,
client requests took longer to return, suggesting that the servers were over saturated in
processing network messages. We note, however, that the original PBFT protocol guar-
antees both liveness and safety, thus Hyperledger’s failure to scale beyond 16 servers
is due to the implementation of the protocol. In fact, in the latest codebase (which was
updated after we have finished our benchmark), the PBFT component was replaced by
another implementation. We plan to evaluate this new version in the future work.




















Figure 4.9: Queue length at the client.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the request queue at the client for the settings of 20 servers and
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20 clients. The queue behavior of Ethereum reflects the normal case, i.e. the queue grew
and shrank depending on how fast the transactions are committed. Hyperledger failed to
generate blocks in this case, therefore the queue never shrank. However, there are dura-
tions in which the queue size remains constant. Furthermore, at the beginning, the queue
in Hyperledger is smaller than that in Ethereum, even though the clients are sending at
the same rate. This suggests there is a bottleneck in processing network requests at the
Hyperledger servers.




































Figure 4.10: Performance scalability (with 8 clients).
The results so far indicate that scaling both the number of clients and number of
servers degrades the performance and even causes Hyperledger to fail. We next ex-
amined the costs of increasing the number of servers alone while fixing the number
of clients. Figure 4.10 shows that the performance becomes worse as there are more
servers, meaning that the systems incur some network overheads. Because Hyperledger
is communication bound, having more servers means more messages being exchanged
and higher overheads. For Ethereum, even though it is computation bound, it still con-
sumes a modest amount of network resources for propagating transactions and blocks to
other nodes. Furthermore, with larger network, the difficulty is increased to account for
the longer propagation delays. We observe that to prevent the network from diverging,
the difficulty level increases at a higher rate than the number of nodes. Thus, one reason
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for Ethereum’s throughput degradation is due to network sizes. Another reason is that
in our settings, 8 clients send requests to only 8 servers, but these servers do not always
broadcast transactions to each other (they keep mining on their own transaction pool).
As a result, the network mining capability is not fully utilized.
4.1.3 Fault tolerance and security






















Figure 4.11: Failing 4 nodes at 250th second (fixed 8 clients) for 12 and 16 servers. X-12 and
X-16 mean running 12 and 16 servers using blockchain X respectively.
To evaluate how resilient the systems are to failures by crashing, we ran the systems
with 8 clients for over 5 minutes, during which we killed off 4 servers at the 250th sec-
ond. Figure 4.11 shows that Ethereum is nearly unaffected by the change, suggesting
that the failed servers do not contribute significantly to the mining process. In Parity,
each node generates blocks at a constant rate, thus failing 4 nodes means the remain-
ing nodes are given more time to generate more blocks, therefore the overall through-
put is unaffected. In contrast, the throughput drops considerably in Hyperledger. For 12
servers, Hyperledger stops generating blocks after the failure, which is as expected be-
cause the PBFT can only tolerate fewer than 4 failures in a 12-server network. With 16
servers, the system still generated blocks but at a lower rate, which was caused by the re-
maining servers having to stabilize the network after the failures by synchronizing their
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Figure 4.12: Blockchain forks caused by attacks that partitions the network in half at 100th sec-
ond and lasts for 150 seconds. X-total means the total number of blocks generated in blockchain
X, X-bc means the total number of blocks that reach consensus in blockchain X.
views.
We next simulated the attack that renders the blockchain vulnerable to double spend-
ing. The attack, described in Section 3.3, partitioned the network at the 100th second
and lasted for 150 seconds. We set the partition size to be half of the original2. Fig-
ure 4.12 compares the vulnerability of the three systems running with 8 clients and 8
servers. Recall that vulnerability is measured as the differences in the number of total
blocks and the number of blocks on the main branch (Section 3.3), we refer to this as
∆. Both Ethereum and Parity blockchains fork at the 100th second, and ∆ increases as
time passes. For the attack duration, up to 30% of the blocks are generated in the forked
branch, meaning that the systems are highly exposed to double spending or selfish min-
ing attacks. When the partition heals, the nodes come to consensus on the main branch
and discard the forked blocks. As a consequence, ∆ stops increasing shortly after 250th
second. Hyperledger, in stark contrast, has no fork which is as expected because its con-
sensus protocol is proven to guarante safety. We note, however, that Hyperledger takes
longer than the other two systems to recover from the attacks (about 50 seconds more).
2We note that partitioning a N -node network in half does not mean there are N/2 Byzantine nodes. In
fact, Byzantine tolerance protocols do not count network adversary as Byzantine failure
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This is because of the synchronization protocol executed after the partitioned nodes re-
connect.




















Figure 4.13: Performance of the three blockchain systems versus H-Store.
We compared the performance of the three blockchain systems against a popular in-
memory database system, namely H-Store, using the YCSB and Smallbank workload.
We ran H-Store’s own benchmark driver and set the transaction rate at 100,000 tx/s. Fig-
ure 4.13 shows at least an order of magnitude gap in throughput and two orders of mag-
nitude in latency. Specifically, H-Store achieves over 140K tx/s throughput while main-
taining sub-millisecond latency. The gap in performance is due to the cost of consen-
sus protocols. For YCSB, for example, H-Store requires almost no coordination among
peers, whereas Ethereum and Hyperledger suffer the overhead of PoW and PBFT.
An interesting observation is the overhead of Smallbank. Recall that Smallbank is a
more complex transactional workload than YCSB, in which multiple keys are updated
in a single transaction. Smallbank is simple but is representative of the large class of
transactional workloads such as TPC-C. We observe that in H-Store, Smallbank achieves
6.6x lower throughput and 4x higher latency than YCSB, which indicates the cost of
distributed transaction management protocol, because H-Store is a sharded database. In
contrast, the blockchain suffers modest degradation in performance: 10% in throughput
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and 20% in latency. This is because each node in blockchain maintains the entire state
(replicated state machine), thus there is no overhead in coordinating distributed transac-
tions as the data is not partitioned.
The results demonstrate that blockchain performs poorly at data processing tasks cur-
rently handled by database systems. However, we stress that blockchains and databases
are designed with different goals and assumptions. Specifically, the protocols for Byzan-
tine failure tolerance are an overkill for traditional database settings where there are only
crash failures. Other features which are optional in most database systems are cryp-
tographic signatures on every single transaction, and wide-area fully replicated state
machines. Although databases are designed without security features and tolerance to
Byzantine failures, we remark that the gap remains too high for blockchains to be dis-
ruptive to incumbent database systems. Nevertheless, the popularity of blockchain is
a clear indication that there is a need for a Byzantine tolerant data processing systems
which can accommodate a large number of users. With the emergence of faster and
more trustworthy hardware primitives, perhaps it is time for the database community
to revise interest in high-performance, decentralized P2P database systems.
4.2 Micro benchmarks
This section discusses the performance of the blockchain system at execution, data and
consensus layers by evaluating them with micro benchmark workloads. For the first two
layers, the workloads were run using one client and one server. For the consensus layer,
we used 8 clients and 8 servers.
4.2.1 Execution layer
We deployed the CPUHeavy smart contract that is initialized with an integer array of a
given size. The array is initialized in descending order. We invoked the contract to sort














































Figure 4.14: CPUHeavy workload, ‘X’ indicates Out-of-Memory error.
memory usage. The results for varying input sizes are shown in Figure 4.14. Although
Ethereum and Parity use the same execution engine, i.e. EVM, Parity’s implementation
is more optimized, therefore it is more computation and memory efficient. An interest-
ing finding is that Ethereum incurs large memory overhead. In sorting 10M elements, it
uses 22GB of memory, as compared to 473MB used by Hyperledger. Ethereum runs out
of memory when sorting more than 10M elements. In Hyperledger, the smart contract
is compiled and runs directly on the native machine within Docker environment, thus it
does not have the overheads associated with executing high-level EVM byte code. As
the result, Hyperledger is much more efficient in term of speed and memory usage. Fi-
nally, we note that all three systems fail to make use of the multi-core architecture, i.e.
they execute the contracts using only one core.
4.2.2 Data model
IO Heavy. We deployed the IOHeavy smart contract that performs a number of read
and write operations of key-value tuples. We used 20-byte keys and 100-byte values.
Figure 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 report the average write/read throughput and disk usage for
these operations, respectively. Ethereum and Parity use the same data model and inter-
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Figure 4.15: Average write throughput in IOHeavy workload, ‘X’ indicates Out-of-Memory er-
ror.
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Figure 4.16: Average read throughput in IOHeavy workload, ‘X’ indicates Out-of-Memory error.






















Figure 4.17: Disk usage in IOHeavy workload, ‘X’ indicates Out-of-Memory error.
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nal index structure, therefore they incur similar space overheads. Both use an order of
magnitude more storage space than Hyperledger which employs a simple key-value data
model. Parity holds all the state information in memory, so it has better I/O performance
but fails to handle large data (capped by over 3M states under our hardware settings).
On the contrary, Ethereum only caches only parts of the state in memory (using LRU for
eviction policy), therefore it can handle more data than Parity at the cost of throughput.
Hyperledger leverages RocksDB to manage its states, which makes it more efficient at
scale.
Analytic Queries. We implemented the analytics workload by initializing the three
systems with over 120, 000 accounts with a fixed balance. We then pre-loaded them with
100, 000 blocks, each contains 3 transactions on average. The transaction transfers a
value from one random account to another random account. Due to Parity’s overheads
in signing transactions when there are many accounts, we considered transactions using
only 1024 accounts. We then executed the two queries described in Section 3.4 and mea-
sured their latencies. Figure 4.18 shows that the performance for Q1 is similar, whereas
in Figure 4.19 Q2 sees a significant gap between Hyperledger and the rest. We note that
the main bottleneck for both Q1 and Q2 is the number of network (RPC) requests sent
by the client. For Q1, the client sends the same number of requests to all systems, there-
fore their performance are similar. On the other hand, for Q2 the client sends one RPC
per block to Ethereum and Parity, but only one RPC to Hyperledger because of our cus-
tomized smart contract implementation. This saving in network roundtrip time translates
to over 10x improvement in Q2 latency.
Figure 4.20 shows the implementation of the smart contract method that answers Q2
of the analytics workload. To support historical data lookup, we append a counter to the
key of each account. To fetch a specific version of an account, we use key account:version.
We store the latest version of the account using key account:latest, and keep
a CommitBlock in the data field for every version which indicates in which block
the balance of this version is committed. To answer the query that fetches a list of bal-
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Figure 4.18: Analytics workload Q1 latency.



























Figure 4.19: Analytics workload Q2 latency.
ance belongs to a given account within a given block range, the method scans all ver-
sions of this account and returns the balance values that are committed within the given
block range. Ethereum and Parity provide JSON-PRC APIs getBalance(account,
block) to query information of an account at a given block number. This API fetches
only one version of the account per HTTP roundtrip, so it is less efficient than pushing
the query logic to the server side.
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new_txn = transaction_t {
from_account, to_account, value
}















if acc.CommitBlock >= start_block &&
acc.CommitBlock < end_block {
ret = append(ret, acc)































Figure 4.21: Throughput of DoNothing workload.
We deployed the DoNothing smart contract that accepts a transaction and returns im-
mediately. We measured the throughput of this workload and compared against that of
YCSB and Smallbank. The differences compared to other workloads, shown in Fig-
ure 4.21 is indicative of the cost of consensus protocol versus the rest of the software
stack. In particular, for Ethereum we observe 10% increases in throughput as compared
to YCSB, which means that execution of the YCSB transaction accounts for the 10%
overhead. We observe no differences among these workloads in Parity, because the bot-
tleneck in Parity is due to transaction signing (even empty transactions still need to be




5.1 Discussion and Future Work
We discuss lessons learned from the results and potentials to bring database techniques
into blockchains in this section.
Comparison to database systems. The results presented in the previous chapters demon-
strate that blockchain performs poorly at data processing tasks currently being handled
by database systems. In particular, we observed an order of magnitude gap in perfor-
mance of Hyperledger compared to H-Store for both YCSB and Smallbank workloads.
Furthermore, H-Store scales well beyond 32 nodes. Although databases are designed
without security features and tolerance to Byzantine failures, we remark that the gap re-
mains too high for blockchains to be disruptive to incumbent database systems. Nev-
ertheless, the popularity of blockchain is a clear indication that there is a need for a
Byzantine tolerant data processing systems which can accommodate a large number
of users. Distributed databases designs have diverged from P2P system designs by as-
suming non-Byzantine failures, but with the emergence of faster and more trustworthy
hardware primitives [33], perhaps it is time for the database community to revise interest
in high-performance decentralized, P2P database systems.
Usability of blockchain. Our experience in working with the three blockchain systems
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confirms the belief that in its current state blockchain are not yet ready for mass usage.
Both their designs and codebases are still being refined constantly, and there are no other
established applications besides crypto-currency. Of the three systems, Ethereum is
more mature both in terms of its codebase, user base, and developer community. An-
other usability issue we encountered is in porting smart contracts from one system to
another, because of their distinct programming models (see Chapter 3). This is likely to
be exacerbated as more blockchain platforms are being proposed [19, 53].
Bringing database designs into data model layer of blockchain. The challenge in
scaling blockchain by improving its consensus protocol is being addressed in many re-
cent works [37, 41]. However, as we demonstrated in the previous section, there are
other performance bottlenecks. We propose our approaches to a better design of data
model layer using our recent storage system UStore [20].
Scalable data model layer. One of our approaches is to decouple storage, execution
engine and consensus layer from each other, then optimize and scale them indepen-
dently. Data model layer in the current design of private blockchain platforms usually
deploys on a single node. However, in our experiments, we show that the scalability of
the systems is limited by the hardware of a single node. UStore is a distributed storage
system, and it is scalable to handle large data volume.
Immutability and data de-duplication. One important feature of blockchain is its data
immutability. One challenge of immutability is the large storage space consumption.
UStore embraces a novel combination of traditional B-Tree and Merkle Tree as its data
indexing technique. This indexing data structure ensures each data chunk is content-
addressable. Two data chunks with the same content will only be stored once in UStore,
so that it can achieve data de-duplication. This feature is the key to handling the large
volume immutable historical data and accelerates the data synchronization between two
peers in a blockchain network.
Rich data types and semantics. Current systems employ generic key-value storage,
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which may not be best suited to the unique data structure and operations in blockchain.
UStore supports flexible built-in data types, e.g., list, map, and set. These data types help
to ease development of the smart contract layer. UStore also provides useful semantics
such as API for getting previous versions of a data object, which is useful for data audit-
ing query processing.
Other approaches to more efficient blockchain. UStore [20], as a storage system, con-
centrates on the data model layer of a blockchain system. Nevertheless, there are other
approaches to the better performance of blockchains focus on the other two layers, i.e.,
smart contract execution layer and consensus layer. We propose three approaches in ap-
plying design principles from database systems to improve blockchains.
Embrace new hardware primitives. Many data processing systems are taking advan-
tage of new hardware to boost their performance [22, 56, 59]. For blockchain, using
trusted hardware, the underlying Byzantine fault tolerance protocols can be modified
to incur fewer network messages [14]. Systems like Parity and Ethereum can take ad-
vantage of multi-core CPUs and large memory to improve contract execution and I/O
performance.
Sharding. Blockchain is essentially a replicated state machine system, in which each
node maintains the same data. As such, blockchains are fundamentally different to database
systems such as H-Store in which the data is partitioned (or sharded) across the nodes.
Sharding helps reduce the computation cost and can make transaction processing faster.
The main challenge with sharding is to ensure consistency among multiple shards. How-
ever, existing consistency protocols used in database systems do not work under Byzan-
tine failure. Nevertheless, their designs can offer insights into realizing a more scalable
sharding protocol for blockchain. Recent work [41] has demonstrated the feasibility of
sharding the consensus protocol, making important steps towards partitioning the entire
blockchain.
Support declarative language. Having a set of high-level operations that can be com-
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posed in a declarative manner makes it easy to define complex smart contracts. It also
opens up opportunities for low-level optimizations that speed up contract execution.
5.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, on the topic of Blockchain we focus on the design of performance eval-
uation and comparison framework for private blockchains. We propose the first bench-
marking framework, called BLOCKBENCH. As more and more blockchain systems are
being proposed, each offering different sets of feature, BLOCKBENCH’s main value is
that it narrows down the design space into four distinct abstraction layers. Our survey
of current blockchain systems shows that the four layers are sufficient to capture the key
characteristics of these systems.
BLOCKBENCH contains workloads for measuring the systems overall data process-
ing performance, and workloads for understanding the performance at different layers
of the blockchain. Using BLOCKBENCH, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of 3
blockchain systems, namely Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger with 2 macro bench-
marks and 4 micro benchmarks. By benchmarking these three systems, one can gain
insights into the design trade-offs and performance bottlenecks. Using our macro bench-
marks, for example, we identify that the bottleneck in Parity is not due to the consensus
protocol, but due to the server’s transaction signing. In the micro benchmarks, by run-
ning the IOHeavy workload we identify that Parity trades performance for scalability by
keeping states in memory. Another example is the trade-off in data model made by Hy-
perledger. On the one hand, the simple key-value model means some analytical queries
cannot be directly supported. On the other hand, it enables optimization that helps an-
swering the queries more efficiently. We argue that such insights are not easy to extract
without a systematic analysis framework.
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